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I 
ARGUMENT < 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S STIPULATION AT TRIAL WAIVING 
CLAIMS UNDER THE ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION 
PROCEDURES ACT AND CONCEDING NON-COMPLIANCE { 
WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BARS HIM 
FROM RAISING THOSE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Through the course of this litigation and up until the 
time of trial/ respondent claimed a breach of contract and 
a violation by appellant of the provisions of the Utah 
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act. Just prior to 
trialf however, respondent abandoned his claim against ap-
pellant for violation of the Termination Procedures Act/ 
and also stipulated on the record there had been no attempt 
whatever to comply with the provisions of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. The record on that matter was quoted 
verbatim in Appellant's Brief at page 7. 
The law with respect to a stipulation made in open 
court is clear and unambiguous: 
"While the issues in a case are usually such as 
are made by the pleadings/ litigants are never- I 
theless at liberty to prescribe the issues to 
be tried/ provided the issues are within the 
power of the court to try/ and they may modify 
or limit the issues made by the pleadings and 
stipulate for a trial on the merits regardless 
of such issues." 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS/ §10 (f) i 
(1953/ as supplemented). 
As a general rule stipulation of parties or counsel made in 
pending proceedings are conclusive as to all matters properly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contained or included therein. The subject matters of the 
agreement and stipulation under consideration here are well 
within the purview of applicable general rules. In Evans 
v. Raper, 185 Okla. 426, 93 P.2d 754, 755 (1939), it is 
stated: 
"It is a well settled proposition of law that 
litigants may stipulate concerning their re-
spective rights involved in the case and are 
bound thereby where the agreements contained 
in the stipulation are not obtained through 
fraud, or not contrary to law or public policy, 
and that the courts will enforce the same." 
See also City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 170 P.2d 928 (Calif. 
1946). At 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS, §22 p. 46 (1953, as supple-
mented) appears the following rule applicable to stipulations 
relating to issues: 
"The rules governing the construction and opera-
tion and effect of stipulations generally apply 
to stipulations with respect to the issues. Ac-
cordingly, the parties are bound by stipulations 
fixing the issues . . ., and will not be permitted 
to depart therefrom." 
To the same effect is 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS, §12 (1953, as 
supplemented): 
"Where a party by stipulation makes a conces-
sion or adopts a theory on which his cause of 
action is determined, he must abide by it on 
appeal." (Emphasis added). 
In Garaventa v. Gardella, 169 P.2d 540 (Nev. 1946), an 
administratrix brought action against a son of the decedent 
to recover stock allegedly held by the son in trust for his 
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brothers and sisters. Early in the trial, before any offer 
of proof concerning the alleged transfer of stock was made, 
both parties waived the provisions of Nevada's deadman 
statute, which provided in part that no person shall be 
allowed to testify when the other party to the transaction 
is dead. Later, when plaintiff objected to a question con-
cerning a conversation between the trustee and decedent, the 
court sustained the objection, reasoning it did not have the 
right to recognize the stipulation. The Nevada court ruled 
otherwise on appeal, recognizing the trial court's refusal 
to honor the stipulation between counsel as error. 
To the same effect is Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 545, 199 P.680 
(1921). There, in an action to set aside deeds of conveyance, 
it was stipulated by the parties that a certain tract of land 
should be eliminated from the action. Nonetheless, the trial 
court decree included the parcel designated for exclusion 
by the stipulation. This court held it manifest error for the 
trial court to ignore the stipulation of counsel and include 
the parcel of land within the Decree. 
The stipulation of counsel on the record before this 
court is clear. The matters to which the stipulation related 
are substantial, and in its absence the trial below would 
have proceeded in a wholly different manner. Compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act constitutes one of 
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appellant's primary defenses herein. The claims of respon-
dent under the Orderly Termination Procedures Act was also 
a matter of substance and waiver of such claims prior to 
trial completely eliminated the presentation of proof by 
both parties at trial regarding said claims. Respondent 
cannot now attempt to resurrect those issues on appeal in 
an attempt to inject new issues into this case on appeal. 
Those issues were finally laid to rest by the stipulation 
of respondent's counsel prior to trial. 
POINT II 
THE 1975 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PERMITTING ACTIONS 
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITIES WITHOUT STATUTORY NOTICE 
OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY ONLY. 
The cause of action which respondent is pursuing herein 
arose in 1973. In 1975 the Utah Legislature amended the 
Governmental Immunity Act to permit filing of actions for 
breach of contract without prior compliance with- the statu-
tory notice and claim provisions of Sections 63-30-12, 13 
and 19 of that Act. 
Respondent argues that the 1975 Amendment was proce-
dural in nature and therefore is entitled to retrospective 
application. This argument is not well-founded. 
It cannot be disputed that the Governmental Immunity 
Act created statutory rights of action where none had 
-4-
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existed at common law. Stevens v. Salt Lake County/ 25 
Ut.2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). In order for the statutory 
cause of action to be pursued, however, this court has re-
i 
quired strict compliance with the notice and claims provi-
sions of the Governmental Immunity Act as a condition 
precedent to bringing the action. Roosendaal Construction 
i 
and Mining vs. Holman, 28 Ut.2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). 
See also Childers v. U.S., 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 
1971). As a condition precedent, the notice and claim 
i 
provisions are substantive because non-compliance effec-
tively bars the action. See, Scarborough v. Granite School 
District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
In a recent case, this court followed analogous rea-
soning in holding the contribution statute (U.C.A. 1953, 
§78-27-39) to operate prospectively only. In Brunyer v. 
Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976), this court rea-
soned that because the contribution statute created a right 
of action where none existed previously, it was not merely 
remedial or procedural, but rather, affected matters of 
substance and was therefore entitled only to prospective 
application. The reasoning of Brunyer is applicable to the 
case at bar. Compliance with the notice and claim provi-
sions was a sine qua non to a right of action against a 
governmental entity for breach of contract under the 
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Governmental Immunity Act prior to the 1975 Amendment. Baugh 
v. Logan City, 27 Ut.2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972). Without 
the Act and compliance therewith, no right of action existed 
at common law. Thus, elimination of the conditions precedent 
imposed by the notice and claim provisions affects the very 
substance of the claim and cannot, therefore, be viewed 
merely as remedial or procedural. 
Further, no legislative intent is evidenced by the 1975 
Amendment which would indicate that the legislature contem-
plated retrospective application. In the absence of such 
intent, the presumption is that the Amendment applies 
prospectively only. 82 C.J.S. STATUTES, §319 (1953, as 
supplemented). Thus, the 1975 Amendment to U.C.A. §63-30-5 
(1953, as amended) is entitled only to prospective application. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION 
PROCEDURES ACT DOES NOT SUPERCEDE OR 
CONFLICT WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMU-
NITY ACT. 
The Termination Procedures Act is administrative in 
nature. Section 53-51-4 of that Act vests the board of 
education of each school district with the right to contract 
with its educators or their associations, or by resolution, 
for establishment of orderly termination procedures. Sec-
tions 53-51-6 and 53-51-7 establish the procedure by which 
-6-
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impartial hearings may be held before either the board or 
appointed examiners to resolve termination disputes. The 
Governmental Immunity Act, however, is judicial in scope. 
Its purpose is to increase the availability of court sanc-
tioned redress from wrongs committed by governmental agencies. 
The fact that a duality of possible remedies exists 
under the Acts does not make them repugnant to each other. 
As noted in 2 Am.Jur.2d, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §784 (1962, as 
supplemented):
 ni 
if "In some circumstances, two remedies may be 
available to the same party for the enforce-
ment of the same right, one in the judicial 
and the other in the administrative forum, 
one by virtue of statute and the other under 
the common law, or both by reason of statute." 
Moreover, the Termination Procedures Act makes explicit pro-
visions for redress to an appropriate court of law. Section 
53-51-7 in pertinent part reads: 
"The boards may delegate to such hearing exa-
miners or may enter into contracts whereby said 
hearing examiners may make decisions relating 
to the employment of the educator which shall 
be binding upon both the educator and the 
board. Nothing herein shall be construed to 
limit the right of either the board or the 
educator to appeal to an appropriate court of 
law." (Emphasis added). 
The legislature, by virtue of the provisions of Section 7 
has authorized court proceedings for enforcing and obtaining 
relief under the Governmental Immunity Act quite apart from 
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proceedings initiated by the examiner under the Termination 
Procedures Act. Nothing in the present case, however, makes 
it necessary to attempt to determine the appropriate occa-
sions for invoking the initial jurisdiction of the courts 
rather than proceeding first through the examiner. Of 
primary importance is the fact that respondent's claim arose 
fully two years before enactment of the Termination Proce-
dures Act. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the Act was in 
existence when respondent's claim arose, nothing in the Act 
makes administrative review by the board or the examiners 
mandatory. Section 7 provides only that the board and 
educator may contractually enter into binding arbitration. 
Section 53-51-6 similarly provides that "Hearings may be 
held before the board . . . " No evidence in support of a 
contractual obligation to arbitrate was presented at trial. 
In Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance & Bartenders Union, 
282 P.2d 632 (Ore. 1955), the Oregon court, in a labor-
management dispute, interpreted an analagous situation 
where administrative and judicial remedies were available. 
The proceeding involved alleged unlawful picketing. From 
an order by the hearing examiner commanding the union to 
cease and desist, an appeal was filed with the intermediate 
court of appeals. That court sustained defendant's demurrer 
and the labor examiner appealed. Addressing respondent's 
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claim of inconsistency in procedural provisions, the Supreme 
Court noted: - ,^, .; 
11
 It is enough to say that there is no necessary 
inconsistency in the law because it provides 
for alternative procedures; and, though it may 
be that the two procedures cannot exist in entire 
peace and harmony, at least they can coexist." 
282 P.2d at 639. 
•"> 
The Gilbertson court also criticized the contention, as 
is made by respondent in the present case, that where irrecon-
cilable conflict exists between various statutory provisions, 
the last provision should prevail. In holding that such 
contention is without satisfactory basis and unsupported by 
sound legislative practice, the court stated: 
"We are not, however, compelled to resort to 
use of a rule, everywhere considered arbitrary 
and unsatisfactory, for the solution of the 
present question; for we think that while the 
provisions under consideration are apparently 
irreconcilable, they are not actually and 
necessarily so, and that under settled rules 
of statutory interpretation they may be har-
monized. That it is the court's duty to har-
monize them, if possible, there can be no 
doubt. (282 P.2d at 638). See also: Univer-
sity of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P.96 
(1899); Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.520 
(1908); Neldon v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P.524 
(1899). 
In Western Beverage Company of Provo v. Hansen, 98 
Utah 232, 96 P.2d 1605 (1939), which respondent also cites, 
this court was asked to resolve two apparently conflicting 
statutes with respect to the question of whether or not the 
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sale of property by a county for general taxes extinguishes 
a city's lien imposed for special improvements. In holding 
the two provisions not inconsistent/ this Court noted that: 
"All provisions [of a statute] must be given 
effect in spite of apparent conflict if it is 
possible to do so. 96 P.2d at 1108. 
This Court also held, (despite respondent's argument to the 
contrary), that: 
"Differences of time [with respect to statutory 
enactments] are to be disregarded in construing 
a code, if, by disregarding them, and looking 
at the work as a whole harmony can thereby be 
produced;" 96 P.2d at 1108. 
From Gilbertson and Western Beverage (supra) it may be 
concluded that the legislature will not enact vain, meaning-
less and conflicting statutes. Hence, even if this court 
determined that the provisions of the Termination Procedures 
Act apply, an interpretation should be adopted which gives 
effect to each provision and harmonizes them with each other 
so that neither will be meaningless. The Termination Proce-
dures Act and the Governmental Immunity Act are not irrecon-
cilable. The desired harmony in the present action can best 
be achieved by recognition of both the administrative nature 
of the Termination Procedures Act and the judicial scope of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Nothing contained therein 
precludes a claimant from pursuing administrative relief 
without sacrificing the substantive right to have such claim 
presented before the appropriate court of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent has stipulated on the record before this 
court that no attempt whatsoever was made to comply with the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The law 
in this state in effect at the time respondent's claim arose 
clearly provided that respondent's failure to give notice of 
the claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
was necessary in a breach of contract action• Respondent's 
stipulation of non-compliance with that Act and abandonment 
of his claim against appellant for violation of the Utah 
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act bar him from 
raising these issues on appeal. 
The 197 5 Amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act 
deleting prior notice requirements operates prospectively 
only and does not operate to bar appellant's valid defense. 
The provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are 
fully compatible with the provisions of the School Termina-
tion Procedures Act insofar as the Governmental Immunity Act 
provides court-sanctioned remedies while the Termination 
Procedures Act is administrative in nature and expressly 
preserves a claimant's right to bring suit in a state dis-
trict court. 
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For the foregoing reasons, appellant requests that this 
Court reverse the judgment below and award the appellant's 
its costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
By_ 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
BY. 
George A. Hunt 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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